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FLORIDA'S NEW "INCOME" TAX
JOSEPH W. JACOBS*
When the Florida Legislature set out to broaden the state's
tax base during the 1986 Regular Session, it extended the sales
tax to services. Unfortunately, lawmakers did not specify what
services would be taxed. In this Article, Professor Jacobs reviews
the ambiguous 1986 Act to determine whether the sales tax may
be applied to employee services unless the legislature limits the
reach of the new levy. He argues that an employee services tax
would differ from an individual income tax, which is prohibited
by the Florida Constitution, and could be sustained by the
courts. Nevertheless, he expresses concern that such a dramatic
change in tax policy could arise from inadvertence.
A TIME BOMB lies buried within the collected laws passed by
the Florida Legislature during the 1986 Regular Session. Un-
less disarmed by legislative action during the 1987 Regular Session,
it will detonate on July 1, 1987. The result will be something look-
ing very much like a five percent tax imposed on all income earned
in Florida.
This time bomb is hidden deep within chapter 86-166,1 cap-
tioned "an act relating to sales tax exemptions. . .. " Public inter-
est in this law, to the extent that it exists at all, seems to have
focused on the merits of extending the existing general sales tax to
legal and other professional fees.2 The truly spectacular feature of
chapter 86-166 seems to have gone largely unnoticed. Effective
July 1, 1987, there is imposed a five percent tax on the "considera-
tion for performing or providing any service." The phrase "any
service" is not separately defined, but potentially covers a wide
spectrum of situations not specifically considered by the legisla-
tors. Among the more radical possibilities is that the tax reaches
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.S.E.E., 1966, Lehigh Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1969, Yale Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas Mittelateadt in the prepara-
tion of this Article.
1. Ch. 86-166, 1986 Fla. Laws 816.
2. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(d)(1) (1985) exempts from the general sales tax "professional,
insurance, or personal service transactions."
3. Ch. 86-166, § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 819 (amending FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1) (1985)).
Paragraph () is created to read as quoted in the text. The professional services exemption
will "sunset" July 1, 1987. Id. § 8, 1986 Fla. Laws at 825. This same sunset provision also
will remove the existing exemptions for a hodgepodge of items, including magazine subscrip-
tions, solar energy, and other energy-efficient heating and cooling devices. Id.
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an ordinary employee's paycheck." Such a paycheck is pretty
clearly "the consideration [the employee receives] for performing
or providing any service ' ' 5 to his employer. Thus, if an employee
earns $20,000 annually, chapter 86-166 apparently' subjects him to
a $1,000 tax.7
This Article first examines the language of chapter 86-166, con-
cluding that its plain language imposes a five percent tax on all
wages and salaries. It then considers whether the Act, as so inter-
preted, could withstand constitutional attack.
I.
The first thing we do, let's [tax] all the lawyers.'
Florida's sales tax is a traditional sales tax insofar as it imposes
the tax on "every person . . . who engages in the busines of sell-
ing tangible, personal property at retail."9 From the beginning,
however, Florida broke with the custom of sister states by ex-
tending its "sales tax" to other kinds of transactions.10 Chapter
4. This Article focuses on employees and the likelihood that their wages and salaries will
become subject to a five percent tax. FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(j) will in fact cast a wider net.
"[A]ny service," not just one performed by an employee, will potentially become taxable.
Thus, charges made by independent contractors of all types for their services could be
reached.
5. Ch. 86-166, § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 819 (creating FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(j)). The "ser-
vice" provided in this example is the employee's labor. The plain meaning of the stat-
ute-the phrase "any service" is straightforward and clearly broad-arguably overrides the
lack of specific legislative intent and thus imposes a broad-based tax measured by an em-
ployee's earnings. For a general discussion of the plain meaning rule of statutory construc-
tion, see Rhodes & Seereiter, The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in
Florida-An Update, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 485, 486-88 (1985). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 38-41.
6. As discussed later in this Article, there is some question as to the actual intent or
impact of the section. Hence, the word "apparently."
7. The statute is arguably unclear as to whether the tax base is the gross or net consider-
ation received by the employee (gross wages versus take-home pay). This distinction is not
only politically important, it is relevant when analyzing whether ch. 86-166 imposes a "true"
income tax. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
8. Shakespeare, Henry VI (Part II), Act IV, sc. ii, 83. Dick the Butcher, of course, sug-
gested killing the lawyers. Some segments of the Florida Bar have reacted so negatively to
the idea of taxing legal fees that one might think the legislature, like Dick, wished to kill,
not just tax.
9. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (1985). Sales taxes were traditionally "limited to transfers of tan-
gible personal property for purposes other than resale by the purchaser." Hellerstein, The
Scope of the Taxable Sale Under Sales and Use Tax Acts: Sales as Distinguished From
Services, 11 TAX L. R.v. 261, 262 (1956).
10. The original version of ch. 212 imposed the tax on transient lodging charges, a most
unusual feature for a sales tax. Ch. 26319, § 3(a), 1949 Fla. Laws 9, 14 (extraordinary sea-
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212, Florida Statutes," has long taxed most real estate rentals,' 2
admissions to entertainment events,' telephone and cable televi-
sion services, 4 and diaper services,' among other things. Plainly
these items represent transactions above and beyond the retail sale
of tangible personal property.
A. How the Legislature Approached the Revenue Problem
This unique Florida approach to sales taxes is due largely to tax-
ing limitations imposed by the Florida Constitution. 6 As Florida's
population grew, so did the demand for government services and,
consequently, the demand for additional tax revenue to pay for
these services. 17 Since first imposed in 1949,'8 the general sales tax
has been Florida's revenue workhorse.' 9 Thus, when the legislature
found the state in need of additional sources of revenue, it again
turned to chapter 212.20
sion). See also Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1950) (validating criminal prosecution of
landlord who leased to transients and refused to pay "rental" tax).
11. FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1985).
12. In 1969, in response to a perceived need for additional revenue, the legislature both
increased the rate of the sales tax from three to four percent, and extended its reach to
include most rent paid for the lease of real property. Ch. 69-222, § 6, 1969 Fla. Laws 877,
881 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1985)). The principal exceptions are for agri-
cultural property and dwelling units. Id.
13. Ch. 26319, § 4, 1949 Fla. Laws 9, 16 (extraordinary session) (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 212.04 (1985)). Significantly, "[n]o tax shall be levied on admissions to the National
Football League championship game." Compare FLA. STAT. § 212.04(2)(a)(4) (1985) with
I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1985) ("professional football leagues" exempt from federal income
taxation).
14. Ch. 69-222, § 9, 1969 Fla. Laws 877, 884 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(e)1
(1985)).
15. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12A-1.23(2) (1985).
16. Ad valorem taxation of real property and tangible personal property by the state is
forbidden by FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. A tax "upon the income of natural persons" is forbid-
den by FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a).
17. Rep. Samuel P. Bell, Dem., Ormond Beach, speaking to the Florida Bar Board of
Governors on September 19, 1986, estimated the immediate revenue needs at $1.3 billion.
Board opposes sunsetting of lawyers' tax exemption, Florida Bar News, Oct. 1, 1986, at 1,
col. 1. For a discussion of the impact of demographic and economic trends on tax revenues,
see generally Zingale & Davies, Why Florida's Tax Revenues Go Boom or Bust, and Why
We Can't Afford It Anymore, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 433 (1986).
18. Ch. 26319, 1949 Fla. Laws 9 (extraordinary session) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1985)).
19. The great exception and major supplement of this revenue source has been the impo-
sition of an income tax on corporations. See ch. 71-984, 1972 Fla. Laws 57 (current version
at. FLA. STAT. ch. 220 (1985)).
20. For a general discussion of ch. 212, the legislative history of the 1986 Act, and a
summary of taxable events which fall currently within the ambit of ch. 212, see Pierce &
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The legislature eschewed the obvious solution of merely raising
the five percent rate.21 Instead, it borrowed a page from the federal
government,2 2 seeking to raise more revenue by eliminating exemp-
tions now found in chapter 212.23 Some exemptions, such as that
for food,2' are rooted in sound public policy.25 Others, such as the
exemption for chlorine used in swimming pools, 6 have no discern-
ible public policy underpinnings.
Although the entire smorgasbord of existing exemptions was
under scrutiny, legislative attention focused on the so-called "pro-
fessional services" exemption,27 more specifically, on whether law-
yers' fees should be subject to chapter 212.28 Under a classical re-
tail sales tax, the notion of taxing lawyers' fees or any other type of
"pure" service transaction would be preposterous.29 But, as has
been shown, chapter 212 is manifestly more than a classical retail
sales tax; iconoclasm -in Florida's sales tax law is hardly novel.
The question for the legislature became how to extend chapter
212 to reach the revenue gold mine of professional and other pres-
ently untaxed services?
Peacock, Broadening the Sales Tax Base: Answering One Question Leads to Others, 14
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 463 (1986).
21. The last rate increase took place only four years earlier. Ch. 82-154, § 4, 1982 Fla.
Laws 450, 453 (rate raised from four to five percent). Quadrennial rate hikes would doubt-
less overtax the electoral patience, although some legislators seem prepared to do just that.
Rep. Bell has predicted an eventual tax rate of eight percent. Board opposes sunsetting of
lawyers tax exemption, Florida Bar News, Oct. 1, 1986, at 4, col. 3.
22. Base-broadening is in vogue in Washington, too. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, - Stat. -, seeks to "broaden the base" to which the federal income tax
applies, permitting significant rate reductions without a loss of revenue. See H.R. REP. No.
841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1986). See also Chirelstein, Back From the Dead: How
President Reagan Saved the Income Tax, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 207 (1986).
23. Sales taxes frequently have been referred to as taxes by exemption. Barnett & Kirk-
wood, Sale and Use Taxes, 1 FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 663, 668 (Florida Bar 1984).
An examination of the length and complexity of FLA. STAT. § 212.08 establishes that Florida
has been no different in this regard. See FLA. STAT. § 212.08 (1985).
24. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(1) (1985).
25. Experts seem to agree that by exempting food for human consumption, a sales tax is
made far less regressive. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 197 (4th ed. 1983).
26. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12A-1.20(11)(b) (1985). Chapter 86-166 overrules this exemp-
tion. Ch. 86-166, § 5; 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 823.
27. "Also exempted are professional, insurance, or personal service transactions which
involve sales as inconsequential elements for which no separate charges are made." FLA.
STAT. § 212.08(7)(d)(1) (1985). This language is found in other sales tax statutes. See Heller-
stein, supra note 9, at 277 n.43.
28. See, e.g., Board opposes sunsetting of lawyers' tax exemption, Florida Bar News,
Oct. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
29. "It would be strange indeed to consider that the lawyer drawing a will, the account-
ant a report, or the architect plans, are making 'sales'." Hellerstein, supra note 9, at 276-77.
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B. The Statutory Drafting Problems Facing the Legislature
A fine start toward this objective could be made by the repeal of
the professional and other services exemption.30 But mere repeal of
the exemption might not do the trick. True, by repeal the legisla-
ture would remove an express prohibition now governing the De-
partment of Revenue's conduct. Under our system of government,
however, the tax collector is not privileged to begin collecting taxes
merely because there is no specific statutory prohibition. Affirma-
tive statutory authority is necessary.3'
As applied to chapter 212, the question would be whether the
operative taxing section3 2 (as it presently exists) affirmatively im-
poses a tax on services, the levying of which being blocked only by
a statutory services exemption? The answer is a resounding
"maybe.""3
C. The Four-Step "Solution"
The solution reached by legislators has four steps. First, repeal
the professional and other services exemption. 4 Second, add lan-
guage to the operative provisions of chapter 212 expressly taxing
services and providing a rudimentary collection mechanism.3 5
Third, delay the effective date of steps one and two for more than
a year, until July 1, 1987.36 And fourth, set up a commission to
study the question and make recommendations before the begin-
ning of the 1987 Regular Session.3
30. Ch. 86-166, § 8, 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 825.
31. T. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 41-43 (2d ed. 1886).
32. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 is the principal operative section of ch. 212. It imposes the tax on
retail sales of tangible personal property. FLA. STAT. §§ 212.03, .031, and .04 are also opera-
tive sections, dealing with the tax on rents and admissions.
33. As written, § 212.05 reaches "every person . . . who . . . furnishes any of the . . .
services taxable under this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (1985). Clearly the statute contem-
plates that at least some services are taxable. None of the eight existing paragraphs of §
212.05(1) taxes professional or other services. The argument for taxability, then, would rest
on the inference resulting from the repeal of the professional services exemption. Restated,
if the services were not prima facie taxable under § 212.05(1), why was the professional
services exemption of § 212.08(7)(d)(1) needed in the first place?
34. Ch. 86-166, § 8, 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 825.
35. Id. § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws at 819 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(j)). The collec-
tion problem is solved by adding new paragraph (k) to FLA. STAT. § 212.06(2): "'Dealer' also
means any person who provides or performs a taxable service for consideration." Ch. 86-166,
§ 4, 1986 Fla. Laws at 821. The collection mechanism of ch. 212 revolves around the classifi-
cation of certain persons as "dealers" responsible for the collection and payment of the tax.
FLA. STAT. § 212.06 (1985).
36. Ch. 86-166, §§ 3, 8, 1986 Fla. Laws 819, 825.
37. Id. § 9, 1986 Fla. Laws at 825.
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The legislature was particularly aggressive in the execution of
steps one and two. The simplest approach would have been to use
the language of the old statutory exemption in the new operative
section. Under this variation, the legislature simply would have
taxed, for example, "professional, insurance, or personal service
transactions which involve sales as inconsequential elements for
which no separate charges are made. ' ' 38 In fact, the legislature went
further. The actual operative provision contains the broadest con-
ceivable language: A five percent tax is imposed on "the considera-
tion for performing or providing any service."39
D. But What Did They Really Mean To Do?
An analysis of the legislative history and a reading of the face of
the statute do not evince any clear expression of intent to impose a
five percent tax on all employee services. There is no preamble
clause, no statutory heading or caption, no committee report stat-
ing: "Beginning next July 1st, all wages and salaries will be subject
to a five percent state tax."
Yet the plain language of chapter 86-166 imposes just such a tax
regardless of the lack of specific legislative expression.4 0 Again, it is
not just the repeal of the services exemption that works this result.
It is the addition of the new paragraph (j)41 that puts the matter
beyond cavil.
The key to legislative intent probably lies in what was identified
as the fourth step, the creation of a new study commission. This
commission is to perform a searching and fearless inventory of all
exemptions, considering a host of policy and economic factors in
the process,42 and then make recommendations to the 1987 legisla-
ture.43 Perhaps the idea was this: Steps one and two have the effect
of putting a loaded gun to the head of the legislature in 1987. The
consequences of inaction will be so horrendous as to make inaction
distasteful, to say the least."
38. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(d)(1) (1985).
39. Ch. 86-166, § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws at 820 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(j))
(emphasis added).
40. See Rhodes & Seereiter, supra note 5, at 486-88.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
42. Ch. 86-166 contains specific instructions to the commission. Ch. 86-166, § 9, 1986 Fla.
Laws 816, 826-27.
43. Id., § 9(3)(a), 1986 Fla. Laws at 826.
44. A Department of Revenue study of ch. 86-166 understates the problem which would
be created by inaction next year. One option would be: "Leave the concept of the current
statute [ch. 86-166] largely unchanged, and proceed to register all salaried employees as
INCOME TAX
However, action by the legislature next year is by no means inev-
itable. Whatever the recommendation of the study commission, it
is likely that the legislature will be asked to raise someone's taxes
next year. The incentive to avoid voting for a tax increase is obvi-
ous. 45 The legislature avoided the tough political question in 1986
by appointing a commission and putting the matter off one year.
The legislature could avoid the question in 1987 by inaction, al-
lowing chapter 86-166 to spring into life on July 1, 1987. That way
no one takes responsibility, at least not until the matter is taken
into the courts following the inevitable challenge that chapter 86-
166 imposes a "tax on income" within the meaning of article VII,
section 5(a) of the Florida Constitution.46
II.
Income tax, if I may be pardoned for saying so, is a tax on
income.47
Lord Macnaghten's intuitive definition of an income tax would
likely accord with the view of most Floridians. A tax which ex-
tracts five percent of everyone's yearly earnings sure looks like an
income tax. Your author raised just this issue with several attor-
neys and colleagues. Their response was remarkably uniform. After
strong initial disbelief that the legislature really passed such a tax,
they responded: "Oh. If that's what they did, then it's obviously
unconstitutional. ",48
With due respect to these colleagues, the legal answer to whether
this new "services tax"4 9 is an income tax is not so obvious. The
Florida Constitution does, of course, prohibit the imposition of an
sales tax dealers. While this approach is . .. straightforward, it is likely to be met with
significant taxpayer resistance." Florida Dep't of Revenue, Study of Legal, Administrative
and Revenue Implications of Applying the Sales and Use Tax to Services 21 (Aug. 25, 1986)
(unpublished report) (on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Dep't of Revenue Study].
45. The voters probably would not take great solace in the explanation that less tax
would be imposed by such a bill (that is, any bill the legislature may pass in 1987) than
would have been imposed automatically by ch. 86-166.
46. See infra note 50.
47. London County Council v. Attorney General, 1901 A.C. 26, 35 (H.L. 1900)
(Macnaghten, L.J.).
48. Most treated my assertion that a broad services tax was enacted as a prank.
49. The neutral term "services tax" is used in this part to describe the tax to be imposed
by FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)0). As discussed below, the name given to this tax exerts a
profound influence on its constitutional vitality.
1986]
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individual income tax." But only a "tax on income" is proscribed.
A tax levied on something else is not expressly prohibited. 1
A court squarely presented with the constitutional question
could hold the services tax unconstitutional.5 2 The court's initial
reaction would likely mirror that of my colleagues: the services tax
is a disguised income tax. Abundant precedent supports such a rul-
ing. 3 The point to be made here, however, is that this same court
could, if so inclined, invoke ample and compelling precedent to
overcome the intuitive reaction of unconstitutionality. Chapter 86-
166 can be sustained.
A. The Excise Tax Argument
An excise tax is a governmental assessment on the privilege of
doing something.5 4 Gasoline taxes, communications taxes, and li-
cense taxes are common examples. Some excise taxes are levied in
the form of a flat charge5 and others as a percentage of the reve-
50. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) prohibits a "tax upon . . . the income of natural persons
who are residents or citizens of the state." This provision is discussed extensively in In Re
Advisory Opinion to Governor, 243 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1971). There, Gov. Askew requested
advice on the constitutionality of his proposed corporate income tax. His theory was that
corporations were not "residents or citizens of the state" within the meaning of the FLA.
CONST. The court ruled that artificial, corporate persons were entitled to the protections of
art. VII, § 5. Id. at 581. A constitutional amendment was needed in order to impose the tax.
This was later passed and is found in art. VII, § 5(b).
51. "The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty, and is possessed by the govern-
ment without being expressly conferred by the people." T. COOLEY, supra note 31, at 4.
52. Ch. 86-166 contains no severability clause. Thus, a constitutional defect in the ser-
vices tax could vitiate the entire chapter.
53. Technical arguments exist which support this conclusion. State ex rel. McKay v.
Keller, 191 So. 542 (Fla. 1939), is helpful. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66. A good
analogy is found in the treatment of local payroll taxes (closely resembling the services tax
at issue here) under the Internal Revenue Code. Section 164(a)(3) grants individuals a de-
duction for "State and local ... income . . . taxes." I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (1985). A number of
local payroll taxes (imposed solely on gross earnings from employment) have been held to be
deductible under this section on the grounds that they are "income taxes" within the mean-
ing of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-598, 1954-2 C.B. 121. See also U.S.
MASTER TAX GUIDE (CCH) 60, Check List VI-State and Local Taxes (1986). Finally, the
four states (Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico, and South Dakota) which have enacted expansive
taxes on services took great care to enact statutes which clearly set out the services to be
taxed and the method for collection. See Dep't of Revenue Study, supra note 44, at Exhibits
C-F. Ch. 86-166 shows no such careful legislative thought. This gives rise to a separate con-
stitutional attack: Whatever the name of the tax imposed by ch. 86-166, it is arguably so
vague as to be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution.
54. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 25, at 185-193. For a more extensive listing of excise
taxes on the federal level, see 1986 U.S. ExcisE TAX GUIDE (CCH) passim.
55. See, e.g., Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 317 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. 1974) (three dollars
per employee "occupational tax").
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nue of the taxed transaction."' Still other excise taxes have used
income as a measuring stick.7 Here the question arises as to
whether the tax is on the privilege of earning the income or upon
the income itself. This distinction is extremely important in Flor-
ida, where an excise tax measured by income is constitutional and
a tax on the income itself is not."
The key to the analysis is the identification of the fine line be-
tween these two concepts. Four seminal cases indicate the diffi-
culty courts have had with the issue. Of these, two Florida cases
set the stage.
In Gaulden v. Kirk," the petitioner was arrested because he re-
fused to pay Florida's then recently enacted tax measured by the
gross receipts of his business.6 Mr. Gaulden instituted habeas
corpus proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.61 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the tax, holding it was
not imposed directly on personal property or services, but "upon
the privilege of selling the same."'1 The tax, therefore, was an ex-
cise tax which could be levied without constitutional implications.
A counterpoint is provided by State ex rel. McKay v. Keller, 3
involving an attempt by the City of Tampa to impose a tax on
attorneys. 4 The levy was characterized as a "license tax," the pay-
ment of which being a prerequisite to the annual issuance of a city
license. The amount of the tax was computed by charging $25 for
the first $2,500 of an attorney's gross receipts and $10 for each
56. A sales tax computed as a percentage of the gross sales amount is a simple example
of this technique. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(a),(c) (1985).
57. Early Florida examples of this approach include City of DeLand v. Florida Pub.
Serv. Co., 161 So. 735 (Fla. 1935) (municipal excise tax measured by 10% of the charge for
all sales of electricity) and City of Lakeland v. Amos, 143 So. 744 (Fla. 1932) (tax on anyone
who received payments for electricity, measured by gross receipts).
58. See, e.g., Amos, 143 So. at 744. "The tax is not upon earnings, but upon the occupa-
tion or business of selling measured by reference to gross receipts from sales." Id. at 747.
59. 47 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1950).
60. This tax was levied as part of what is popularly called the Florida Revenue Act of
1949. Ch. 26319, 1949 Fla. Laws 9 (extraordinary session) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 212 (1985)). See supra note 10.
61. Gaulden, 47 So. 2d at 567. The version of art. VII, § 5, FLA. CONST. in effect at the
time of this litigation did not provide for a tax upon corporations. See supra notes 19, 50.
62. Gaulden, 47 So. 2d at 574 (emphasis added). The court also noted that in its judg-
ment the tax at issue was not an income tax, it was measured by the compensation received.
Id.
63. 191 So. 542 (Fla. 1939).
64. The Bar might well regard the repeal of the professional services exemption as an
identical effort. See, e.g., Board opposes sunsetting of lawyers tax exemption, Florida Bar
News, Oct. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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$1,000 of receipts thereafter. 5 A local attorney argued that the or-
dinance was an unconstitutional tax upon his income, regardless of
the labels used by the City of Tampa. The city countered by argu-
ing that it had simply imposed a levy on the privilege of practicing
law, measured by the attorney's gross income. Nevertheless, the
Florida Supreme Court struck down the tax as an unconstitutional
income tax a.6 The court did not draw a bright line to differentiate
this case from its precedents, indicating only that "[i]t is not diffi-
cult to distinguish between an excise tax or tax on the privilege of
engaging in an occupation" and a prohibited income tax.
67
Illinois and Colorado also have wrestled with this problem, and
their efforts are relevant to the issues raised in this Article. The
Colorado litigation 8 involved several taxes imposed by the City of
Denver. One of these taxes was entitled "Employee Occupational
Privilege Tax" and taxed all people employed within the City of
Denver, ostensibly for the privilege of working there. The tax was
imposed at the rate of $2 per month on every employee whose
compensation exceeded $250 for that calendar month. The taxes
were challenged as an unconstitutional flat tax on income.70 The
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the tax on the grounds that it was
valid because it did not tax other monetary income such as invest-
ment income and, alternatively, because occupation taxes had been
upheld in a number of other jurisdictions; the court cited cases
from Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Alabama. 71 The tax was mea-
sured at least in part by income, but was valid because it was not
imposed on income.
The Illinois litigation 72 involved something labelled an "Employ-
ers' Expense Tax," which was imposed on the employer for the
privilege of employing people in Chicago; the tax was a flat $3 per
month.7 3 It was argued that the tax was unconstitutional because it
was either an income, earnings, or occupational tax, prohibited by
65. Keller, 191 So. at 543.
66. Id. at 547.
67. Id. at 547-48.
68. City & County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1969).
69. Id. at 343-44.
70. A municipality did not have the authority to enact an income tax because the Colo-
rado Constitution vested that exclusive authority in the state. Id. at 341; City & County of
Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1958).
71. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d at 344.
72. Paper Supply Co. v. City of Chicago, 317 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. 1974).
73. Id. at 5.
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Illinois' constitution. The court upheld the tax concluding that it
did not fall within this prohibition.74
In light of such authority, the case for sustaining Florida's ser-
vices tax is strong. The services tax is expressly imposed on those
"exercising a taxable privilege [by furnishing] services taxable
under this chapter. 7' The formal distinction between a tax mea-
sured by and a tax on income is observed. Gaulden, as well as the
Colorado and Illinois cases, support the constitutionality of the
services tax. Only Keller-which was decided before
Gaulden-militates against it.
B. The Constitutional, Definitional Argument
Essentially, the argument here is that an income tax, as a matter
of constitutional law, must reach both earned income and invest-
ment income, the two types of "classical" income.7 6 A tax which
reaches only earned income or only investment income is not a
true income tax.
A strong Florida constitutional argument has its roots in the fed-
eral constitutional law of income taxes. The debate began in the
last century. In 1894, Congress passed a broad-based tax on indi-
vidual incomes, reaching both earned income and investment in-
come. The tax was immediately attacked as unconstitutional, on
the grounds that it was a "direct" tax that could not be imposed
without apportionment."7 In the famous Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. case, 7 the United States Supreme Court agreed, and
struck down the law.7e
74. Like Colorado's, the Illinois Constitution prohibited a local taxing unit from impos-
ing an income tax without the consent of the General Assembly. Id. at 6. Unlike Colorado's,
the Illinois Constitution went further by prohibiting the imposition of an "occupation tax."
The court implied that a tax imposed on employees might be invalid for that reason, but
likened the tax at issue to a payroll tax, which, if properly levied, could escape the constitu-
tional proscription. Id. at 7-13.
75. Ch. 86-166, § 3, 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 819 (amending FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (1985)).
76. An income tax reaches" 'income'. . . derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined." Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Collector, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
77. The Constitution prohibits Congress from imposing "direct" taxes without appor-
tionment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and § 9, cl. 4 (affected by amend. XVI). Other taxes
may be imposed by Congress under its inherent powers. See License Tax Cases, 72 (5 Wall.)
U.S. 462, 471 (1866).
Direct taxes are valid only if apportioned. As a practical matter, this would mean setting
different rate schedules in each state. For a discussion of the practical problems involved,
see 1 B. BITTKE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 1.2 (1981).
78. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
79. See 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 77, at 1.2. (discussing history of constitutional re-
straints on federal income taxation).
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Friends of the 1894 tax turned their attention to amending the
United States Constitution, convinced that nothing short of
amendment would permit the imposition of a broad-based income
tax. They ultimately prevailed in 1913 when the sixteenth amend-
ment was adopted, permitting Congress to levy an unapportioned
tax on "incomes, from whatever source derived."80 When Congress
was empowered to levy an "income tax," the idea was to permit
Congress to impose a tax like the one invalidated in Pollock.
During this era it was clear that a tax on earned income only was
constitutionally different from the Pollock-type tax. Such a tax
had been sustained in 1880 in Springer v. United States."1 In the
Pollock case itself, the Court intimated that a pure services tax
was valid.82
When the Florida Constitution was amended in 192483 to pro-
hibit imposition of a tax "on income," the federal constitutional
issue was barely ten years old. The argument is that by using iden-
tical language in its constitution, Florida intended to prohibit ex-
actly what Congress was prohibited from doing prior to the six-
teenth amendment: imposition of a Pollock-type, broad-based tax
reaching both earned income and investment income. The services
tax now at issue in Florida is like the tax in Springer. Both reach
only earned income. Neither is an "income tax" for constitutional
purposes.
A related argument centers around deductions. The federal in-
come tax has always used as its tax base the concept of "taxable
income," that is, gross income less certain deductions. 4 There is a
suggestion in early federal case law that deductions are a constitu-
tionally indispensable feature of an income tax.8
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
81. 102 U.S. 586 (1880). Springer considered the Civil War income tax, Act of Mar. 3,
1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479.
82. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635, 637.
83. Fla. SJR 135, 1923 Fla. Laws 483. The amendment was proposed by this joint resolu-
tion in 1923 and was passed by the voters in 1924 during the height of the Florida land
boom.
A sampling of contemporary sentiment is found in the following excerpt from BENSON &
NORTH, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE PRACTICE AND LAW 7 (1924): "[R]ich men are on the ground in
Florida. They call Florida their home. The constitutional provision that Florida shall never
levy either state income or inheritance taxes has attracted them as permanent residents."
To the extent that this passage reflects the intention of the voters, it supports the argument
that the services tax is not an income tax. The concern is for the very rich, those concerned
with inheritance taxes and, presumably, living off investment income, not earnings.
84. I.R.C. § 63 (1985).
85. See Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916). See also 1 B. BITTKER, supra
note 77, at 1 5.4.
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The Florida services tax offers, by its terms, no deductions. It is
measured by "gross," not "net" income. In a very significant re-
spect, therefore, the Florida services tax differs from a classical in-
come tax. That difference, in tandem with the failure of the ser-
vices tax to reach investment income, is sufficient to distinguish it
from a prohibited income tax.
C. The Policy Arguments
Proponents of the services tax could make at least two powerful
fairness arguments. First, the services tax would be less regressive
than the existing general sales tax.86 Indeed, the regressivity ques-
tion is one which the new study commission is to consider . 7 Sec-
ond, a payroll tax would likely be deductible for federal income tax
purposes.88 Beginning January 1, 1987, a sales tax is not deductible
for federal income tax purposes.89 All things being equal, Floridi-
ans would benefit from the ability to deduct their tax payments for
federal income tax purposes. Because the technical arguments for
and against the constitutionality of the services tax are close, such
policy arguments may indeed be the deciding factor.
III.
This fine trap was sprung in the semi-final round .. 90
In its efforts to increase state revenue, the Florida Legislature
has broadened the tax base by enacting a statute which looks very
much like an income tax. For the reasons stated in this Article,
this tax may be legally enforceable despite the generally held no-
tion that any tax measured by individual income is unconstitu-
tional, whatever its form. It is disturbing that this "income" tax
was passed without apparent deliberation or public debate, and
that it will automatically become law unless contrary legislative ac-
86. The experts, even though they are economists, seem to agree that general sales taxes
are highly regressive, and proportional income taxes less so. See J. PECHMAN, supra note 25,
at 255 et seq.
87. Ch. 86-166, § 9(3)(a)(3), 1986 Fla. Laws 816, 826.
88. The trick would be to argue that the services tax is an "income tax" within the
meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 164(a)(3) but is not an "income tax" within the mean-
ing of art. VII, § 5(a), FLA. CONST. See supra note 53 (discussion of deductibility of taxes
similar to services tax).
89. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 133, - Stat. - (amending
I.R.C. § 164(a) (1985)). Section 133, effective in 1987, removes the present deduction for
state and local sales taxes.
90. W. LOMBARDY, MODERN CHESS OPENING TRAPS 19 (1972).
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tion is taken before July 1, 1987. A matter of such significance,
marking such a substantial change from prior policy, deserves
more deliberate treatment.
The creation of the study commission, while commendable, is
hardly a failsafe device to prevent detonation of the services tax
time bomb. The legislature will have the benefit of the study com-
mission's report when it reconsiders the whole question of "sales
tax exemptions" in 1987 and its action will, without doubt, attract
greater popular attention than did enactment of chapter 86-166. If
the legislature chooses to tax income, directly or indirectly, now or
next year, it should do so only after the proposal has been fully
aired and the difficult implementation issues explored. If it chooses
to retreat from the full-blown services tax, it will have a golden
opportunity. The resulting "Tax Reduction Act of 1987" would be
the largest tax break in Florida history.
